International Experience with Private Sector Participation in Power Grids : Peru Case Study

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作者：

World Bank Group

来源地址：

http://hdl.handle.net/10986/23616

关键词：

AUCTION;  TARIFFS;  HOLDING COMPANY;  AUCTION SYSTEM;  SPOT PRICE;  TRANSMISSION CAPACITY;  PUBLIC UTILITIES;  POWER PLANTS;  ECONOMIC GROWTH;  TRANSMISSION ASSETS;  PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION;  PAYMENT OBLIGATIONS;  ELECTRICITY TARIFF;  PUBLIC SECTOR;  ACTIVITIES;  GENERATION;  DEMAND FOR POWER;  EMISSIONS;  PUBLIC SERVICES;  POWER SYSTEM;  POWER GRIDS;  ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES;  INCENTIVES;  PUBLIC POWER;  DISTRIBUTION ASSETS;  GAS;  WHOLESALE MARKET;  PUBLIC ASSETS;  PRICE;  VOLTAGE;  RETAIL CONSUMERS;  PUBLIC BIDDING;  ELECTRICITY GENERATION;  DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRICITY;  TRANSMISSION SYSTEM;  TRANSMISSION FACILITIES;  SINGLE CONCESSION;  ELECTRICITY TARIFF;  POWER SYSTEM;  CONSUMPTION OF POWER;  CONCESSIONAIRES;  ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION;  OPEN ACCESS;  GENERATORS;  SOURCE OF ELECTRICITY;  REGIONAL UTILITIES;  TRANSPARENT BIDDING;  CONCESSION;  PRESENT VALUE;  POWER INVESTMENTS;  OIL;  POWER SYSTEMS;  TRANSMISSION FACILITIES;  POWER GENERATION;  ELECTRICITY TARIFFS;  SUSTAINABLE ENERGY;  POWER SECTOR;  GAS DEVELOPMENT;  CONTRACTS;  ENERGY SUPPLY;  TRANSMISSION GRID;  ELECTRIFICATION;  OPTIONS;  WATER;  ENERGY RESOURCES;  POWER SECTOR;  CONCESSION CONTRACTS;  DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES;  GENERATION ASSETS;  DIVESTITURE;  DISTRIBUTION LOSSES;  ELECTRICITY SUPPLY;  LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES;  FUEL PRICES;  ENERGY AUCTIONS;  CUSTOMER SERVICE;  MARKET RULES;  CONCESSION AREAS;  SAFE SUPPLY;  OWNERSHIP OF GENERATION;  CAPACITY CHARGES;  PUBLIC UTILITIES;  DISPATCH OF GENERATION;  PUBLIC INVESTMENT;  CARBON EMISSIONS;  INFRASTRUCTURE;  PRIVATIZATION PROCESS;  AUCTIONS;  ENERGY CONSUMPTION;  TRANSMISSION LINES;  TRANSMISSION PRICING;  ECONOMIC COSTS;  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE;  GENERATING CAPACITY;  ELECTRIC POWER;  BALANCE;  TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS;  BIDDING PROCESS;  MARKET PRICES;  UTILITIES;  SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY;  POWER;  ELECTRICITY;  CONCESSIONS;  FOREIGN INVESTMENT;  ENERGY SUPPLY;  HYDROPOWER;  MARGINAL COSTS;  ELECTRICITY GENERATION;  RURAL ELECTRIFICATION;  ELECTRICITY TARIFFS;  FUEL PRICES;  DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES;  SUPPLY CONTRACTS;  REPLACEMENT VALUE;  PUBLIC BIDDING PROCESS;  NATURAL MONOPOLY;  TRANSMISSION SYSTEM;  TRANSMISSION LOSSES;  FOREIGN EXCHANGE;  ENERGY PRICES;  GENERATING CAPACITY;  HYDROPOWER PLANT;  ENERGY PRODUCTION;  POWER GENERATION;  DEMAND FOR POWER;  ENERGY EFFICIENCY;  ELECTRICITY PRICES;  ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY;  ELECTRICITY MARKET;  POWER CONCESSIONS;  ENERGY LOSSES;  NATURAL GAS;  ENERGY PRODUCTION;  DISTRIBUTION GRID;  INVESTMENT;  LOWER PRICES;  CONTRACT MARKET;  ECONOMIC CRISIS;  ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS;  TARIFF;  ELECTRICITY SUPPLY;  POWER SECTOR REFORM;  FUEL;  INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS;  POWER SECTOR PLANNING;  AVAILABILITY;  FACILITIES;  RURAL ELECTRIFICATION;  INVESTMENTS;  HORIZONTAL CONCENTRATION;  POWER GRIDS;  RENEWABLE ENERGY;  PRICE CONTROLS;  COMPETITIVE BIDDING;  ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION;  POWER FLOWS;  ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;  PUBLIC MONOPOLIES;  ENERGY COSTS;  ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;  TRANSMISSION LINES;  PRICES;  APPROACH;  POWER PLANT;  ENERGY;  Report;  Rapport;  Informe; 

年份：

2012

出版地：

Washington,USA

语种：

English

摘要：

This case study is part of an analytical effort aimed at advising World Bank staff and country clients on options for private sector participation (PSP) in transmission and distribution. The report is based on data collected on the Peruvian case, the review of literature, as well as on a set of interviews held with power sector agencies, including the regulator and system operator, power sector companies and experts in the field. The problems of the power sector were linked to its structure, a legal framework that guaranteed a public monopoly and the use on subsidies as a political tool to redistribute income and control inflation. The crisis justified measures in line with a thorough neoliberal economic reform that was underway. This reform included the reduction of an oversized public sector and the unbundling and privatization of the power sector. The privatization of transmission was justified on the grounds of attracting fresh capital and achieving greater efficiency. PSP in distribution was justified on the same grounds, plus another important factor, it was seen also as a way to prevent or minimize government interference on the day‐to‐day operations of utilities and, most important, to avoid the politicization of electricity tariffs.