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Data from: The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.sm454
- 摘要:
- traditional modelling approaches in the indirect reciprocity literature in a crucial way—we show that first-order information is sufficient to maintain cooperation
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Presence of a loner strain maintains cooperation and diversity in well-mixed bacterial communities
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.k5n4k
- 摘要:
- , can maintain cooperation and diversity in real-world biological settings. We use mathematical models of public-good-producing bacteria to show tha
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Payoff-based learning explains the decline in cooperation in public goods games
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.cr829
- 摘要:
- t is trying to maximize personal income; (ii) that conditional cooperation disappears when the consequences of cooperation are made clearer; and (iii) tha
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Bacterial quorum sensing and metabolic incentives to cooperate
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.122sv
- 摘要:
- constraint of social cheating provides an explanation for private-goods regulation by a cooperative system and has general implications for populati
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Social learning and the demise of costly cooperation in humans
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.10g95
- 摘要:
- in public-goods games. We found that: (i) social information never increased cooperation and usually led to decreased cooperation; (ii) cooperation was lowest
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.dc42s75
- 摘要:
- ) or dispositional free riders (DFR). Participants then play a one-shot public goods game, either with or without punishment. As expected, DFR cooperate
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Co-evolutionary dynamics between public good producers and cheats in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.45kd1
- 摘要:
- of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, prod
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Microbial expansion-collision dynamics promote cooperation and coexistence on surfaces
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.p8440
- 摘要:
- . This mechanism may be important for maintaining public-goods cooperation-and-conflict in microbial pioneer species living on surfaces.
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Evolutionary dynamics of interlinked public goods traits: an experimental study of siderophore production in Pseudomonas aeruginosa
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.7d3s9
- 摘要:
- Public goods cooperation is common in microbes, and there is much interest in understanding how such traits evolve. Research in recent years ha
![](http://agri.nais.net.cn/resources/front/images/source_91.jpg)
Data from: Cost of cooperation rules selection for cheats in bacterial metapopulations
- 负责人:
- DOI:
- doi:10.5061/dryad.2f4g2h90
- 摘要:
- e iron limitation demanding high siderophore-production efforts, which results in high metabolic costs accruing to cooperators, and thereby facilitates the spread