Data from: Chimpanzees, bonobos and children successfully coordinate in conflict situations

负责人：

Sanchez-Amaro, Alejandro

关键词：

snowdrift coordination conflict chimpanzees bonobos children

DOI：

doi:10.5061/dryad.8638h

摘要：

how chimpanzees, bonobos and children coordinate their actions with a conspecific in a Snowdrift game, which provides a model for understanding how organisms

Data from: The importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation

负责人：

关键词：

non-equilibrium dynamics;social behaviour;simulation model;Prisoners\u2019 Dilemma;Snowdrift game;neural network

DOI：

doi:10.5061/dryad.5hq6r

摘要：

for the evolution of cooperation, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game and the Iterated Snowdrift (ISD) game. Behavioural strategies are either implemented by a 1 : 1 genotype

Data from: Simple parameterization of aerodynamic roughness lengths and the turbulent heat fluxes at the top of midlatitude August?one glacier, Qilian Mountains, China

负责人：

关键词：

DOI：

doi:10.5061/dryad.b2j3405

摘要：

. The parameterization shows that z0m increased sharply when u*b exceeded 0.43 m/s (the approximate threshold value) and that the effect of snowdrift was slight

Data from: The evolution of cooperation by negotiation in a noisy world

负责人：

关键词：

exploitation;evolutionary branching;affiliation;Snowdrift game;negotiation;social behaviour;Plasticity;Eusociality;Response rules;mutualism

DOI：

doi:10.5061/dryad.mr44c

摘要：

Cooperative interactions among individuals are ubiquitous despite the possibility of exploitation by selfish free-riders. One mechanism that may promote cooperation is “negotiation”: individuals altering their behaviour in response to the behaviour of others. Negotiating individuals decide their actions through a recursive process of reciprocal observation, thereby reducing the possibility of free-riding. Evolutionary games with response rules have shown that infinitely many forms of the rule can be evolutionarily stable simultaneously, unless there is variation in individual quality. This potentially restricts the conditions under which negotiation could maintain cooperation. Organisms interact with one another in a noisy world in which cooperative effort and the assessment of effort may be subject to error. Here, we show that such noise can make the number of evolutionarily stable rules finite, even without quality variation, and so noise could help maintain cooperative behaviour. We show that the curvature of the benefit function is the key factor determining whether individuals invest more or less as their partner's investment increases; investing less when the benefit to investment has diminishing returns. If the benefits of low investment are very small then behavioural flexibility tends to promote cooperation, because negotiation enables co-operators to reach large benefits. Under some conditions this leads to a repeating cycle in which cooperative behaviour rises and falls over time, which may explain between-population differences in cooperative behaviour. In other conditions negotiation leads to extremely high levels of cooperative behaviour, suggesting that behavioural flexibility could facilitate the evolution of eusociality in the absence of high relatedness.